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Abstract: 
The interplay between a regional system based on colonial settler communities and the cycles 
of conflict, resistance and reaction which gave rise to African oppositions and liberation 
movements, was characterised by two dominant narratives that were set against each other 
and shaped the politics of post-independent societies. The first is a black liberation narrative, 
claims its legitimacy in its historical opposition to colonialism with special emphasis on the 
peasantry. The second is a neoliberal narrative, emerging out of the transition, reflects the 
political compromises made by elites to gain independence with the new forces of capital – 
mainly globalisation – and its accompanying world order. 
 
Nevertheless, since 2000 and more particularly since Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform, new 
tendencies, new narratives and new norms have mushroomed. Social movements emerged, 
new narratives are developing, and new relationships with Zimbabwe are developed. Each of 
these new developments and narratives become influential sources of policy and political 
action in the present, post-2000 period and become central to the local and regional responses 
to the Zimbabwean crisis. Based on empirical evidence from Zimbabwe’s neighbouring 
countries, the objective of the paper will be to gain an understanding into the nature of 
narratives development concerning land, not only at national level but at the broader African 
state system as well and the degree to which the latter challenge new norms of governance of 
state. 
 





L'interaction entre un système régional fondé sur les communautés de colon et les cycles du 
conflit, de la résistance et de la réaction qui ont donné lieu à des oppositions africaines et des 
mouvements de libération, a produit deux discours dominants à ancrage racial important qui 
se sont confrontés et qui ont esquissé les politiques des sociétés post-indépendantes. Le 
premier, le récit de libération noire, qui réclame sa légitimité dans son opposition historique 
au colonialisme avec une considération particulière concernant la paysannerie. Le deuxième 
est un discours néo-libéral, émergeant de la transition, qui reflète les compromis politiques 
dans lesquels s’est engagé l’élite, avec le capital dans un contexte global nouveau - 
principalement la globalisation. 
 
Néanmoins, depuis 2000 et plus particulièrement depuis la réforme foncière fast-track du 
Zimbabwe, de nouvelles tendances, de nouveaux discours et de nouvelles normes sont 
apparus. Des mouvements sociaux ont émergé, de nouveaux discours se développent et de 
nouveaux rapports avec le Zimbabwe sont développés. Chacun de ces nouveaux 
développements et discours deviennent des sources influentes de politiques et d’action 
politique dans l’actuel période post-2000 et deviennent centraux aux réponses locales et 
régionales à la crise zimbabwéenne. Basé sur des évidences empiriques des pays voisins du 
Zimbabwe, l'objectif du papier est de mieux comprendre la nature de développement des 
discours au sujet de la terre, non seulement au niveau national mais également au niveau d’un 
système d’Etats africains plus large, et le degré d’impactes ceux-ci ont sur les nouvelles 
normes de gouvernance d'Etat. 
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“If the perception is that of Europeans, well, I suppose you are right to say my reputation has 
gone down. But in terms of Africa, go anywhere and I am a hero.” (Mugabe’s answer when 
he was asked if the land invasions hadn't damaged his image, September 2002). 
 
Indeed, Mugabe and his lieutenants win ovations across Africa: at the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, at the summit of the Southern African 
SADC trade bloc in August 2003, or when the re-elected Mbeki government was sworn in in 
2004 at the union Buildings in Pretoria. Mugabe is “speaking for black people worldwide”, 
writes the South African journalist Harry Mashabela (2002). Writing in the Helen Suzman 
Foundation's September newsletter, Mashabela pointed to the adoration Mugabe won: 'The 
applause and standing ovations were a tacit expression of appreciation of the courageous 
stand Mugabe has taken in trying to resolve the critical land problems facing his country.” 
(Hartley, 2003). 
 
Southern Africa was once seen as a region that was thought of as Africa’s emerging 
democratic bastion, where multiparty pluralism had transcended the politics of racial 
exclusion and new leaders had firmly committed themselves to market economies and 
reconciliation. From a scholarly perspective, expectations drawn from the study of 
democratisation in Africa suggest that of all the forms of regime transformations on the 
continent, it is former settler oligarchies that are supposed to be most likely to be able to 
consolidate the gains of democracy (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1994). The transition would, 
according to these scholars, be essentially one of extension of the franchise to formally 
excluded groups, which is in effect contiguous to the process of consolidation. The task of 
nation-building therefore becomes primarily one focused on reconciliation in the aftermath of 
conflict. Issues of citizenship, economic distribution and even competing versions of history 
are all subsumed within the normal pattern of inclusive multiparty politics. 
 
Nevertheless, Zimbabwe’s crisis, precipitated by a government-orchestrated campaign of 
violence against white farmers and an urban-based black opposition movement, offers a 
number of challenges to these conventional wisdoms on democratic transitions in Africa. 
Zimbabwe turned from one of Africa’s miracles into a country where anarchy, undemocratic 
practices and poverty have become the main feature. In addition, Zimbabwe’s slide into 
anarchy has found echoes in the rise in local militancy on the land issue in neighbouring 
states, coupled to the apparent chorus of support for Zimbabwe’s president by fellow 
Southern Africa leaders, and has recast the region as a repository of instability. Since 2000 
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and more particularly since Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform, social movements emerged 
(Landless People’s Mouvement in South Africa), new narratives are developing (anti-
imperialist mouvements, “who is African” debates) and new relationships with Zimbabwe are 
developed (the Namibian case in particular). 
 
The paper will present a deeper insight into the development of these new – often conflicting 
– narratives, identities and land issues. It will seek to examine and analyse the role of land as 
a site and source of new narratives and norms. Being comparative in nature within the 
Southern African region, the objective will be to gain insight into the nature of narratives 
development concerning land, not only at national level but at the broader African state 
system as well and the degree to which the latter challenge new norms of governance of state 
and frame the parameters of political debate and policy development. The first part of the 
paper details narrative discourse into the theoretical landscape as a way of capturing the 
societal dimensions. The second part introduces the historically existing narratives, developed 
through the interplay between a regional system based on colonial settler communities and 
African oppositions and liberation movements, that were set against each other and shaped 
the narratives and politics of post-independent societies. This deliberately historicised 
approach, which recognises the constitutive role of norms in the formation of institutions and 
institutional practice, will lead in the third and last part to the description and explanation of 
the new developments and narratives concerning land, how they become influential sources of 
policy and political action and become central to the local and regional responses to the 
Zimbabwean crisis in the present, post-2000 period. 
 
1. FROM THE DEVELOPMENT OF NARRATIVES AND NORMS TO POLICY 
 
Narratives are understood to be broad renderings of events that contain and convey meaning 
as well as having specific political context for communities in the form of discourses. 
Discourses are ‘not simply ideas, but are also the actions, thoughts and practices that make 
that idea “a reality” by structuring and delineating reality and thereby making it knowable’ 
(Dunn, 2001, p.56). Narrative and discourse are important interpretative devices to this article 
precisely because they acknowledge deep historical process and subjectivity as integral to 
social and institutional formations. The place of narrative and discourse is especially 
important in the context of weakly legitimated states as countervailing societally based 
sources of authenticity and authority. They introduce alternative accounts of history and 
communities’ relationship to the state or state-practice that can challenge the prevailing 
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official narrative1. Furthermore, in the context of societies, the use of narratives explains the 
saliency of ideas, memories and social custom that cut across the boundaries of the state, 
resonating with communities beyond the sovereign divide2. 
 
By way of contrast, the language of norms appears in this account in so far as it relates to the 
concerns of the institutionalisation of transnational ideas that emerge out of narratives and are 
ultimately made explicit in a particular set of formal and informal governing practices 
(Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986). Norms, defined as ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for 
actors with a given identity’, frame the parameters of policy debate on given issues and 
concurrently introduce constraints to decision making as well as, under certain circumstances, 
changes in actor preferences (Krasner, 1983, p.2). It is the constitutive dimension of norms, 
namely, those norms which introduce new interests or categories of action that are reflected in 
new (or reformed) institutions as well as empowering new (non-state) actors to partake in 
policy making. Transitions to democracy typically introduce new norms and/or transform 
extant institutions through an extension of membership and tasks or the means through which 
tasks as pursued (Aggarwal, 1998; Gill, 2000). 
 
Following Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), new democratic norms enter the realm of policy 
debate within the context of pre-established norms. Norm entrepreneurs’ attempts to 
introduce new ideas are mediated through the standards of ‘appropriateness’ linked to these 
existing norms and hold greater possibility of effectiveness when they can be seen to resonate 
with the former. The diffusion of democratic norms follows a pattern (‘life cycle’) 
characterised by norm emergence, a ‘tipping point’, norm cascade and ultimately norm 
internalisation by state actors. The tipping point or threshold is especially important as it is 
the moment when a sufficient number of states as well as influential states have accepted the 
norm, thus paving the way for general acceptance by all (or nearly so) states in regional or 
international system (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Conflicts between norms are also 
subject to exogenous shocks (‘world time context’), which can act to discredit one 
constellation of norms and thus allowing another to replace it within the norm hierarchy. In 
Southern Africa, the discrediting of racial narratives that informed settler colonialism played a 
crucial role in undermining support for settler oligarchies both internationally and 
domestically as did the collapse of communism in paving the way for transitions to 
democracy. 
                                               
1
 Werbner (1998) speaks of these ‘popular counter-memorialisations’ that produced ‘unfinished 
narratives: in which the past is perceived to be unfinished, festering in the present…’. 
2
 Mozaffar et al. (2003) make this argument with respect to poorly understood or legitimated electoral 
institutions in emerging African democracies. 
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The motivation for acceptance of new norms by state actors is important to consider as well. 
According to Finnemore and Sikkink, governing elites respond to norms when their 
legitimacy is threatened, when prominent states abide by a particular norm, for the intrinsic 
(usually universalistic) qualities of the norm, adjacency claims to existing norms and the 
aforementioned impact of the world time context. Gourevitch (1978) and Risse-Kappen 
(1994) tell us that domestic structures and state-societal relations are key determinants of 
norm acceptance: in this context, the problematic of transnational norm diffusion in non-
Western settings needs to be recognised. Acharya (2003) notes that socio-cultural factors such 
as belief systems influence the degree to which resistance, adaptation and adoption, or 
replacement strategies are employed by local actors in Southeast Asia. Narratives rooted in 
social structures and practices dictate the degree to which international norms are subjected to 
‘localisation’ and transformation when absorbed within non-Western states. In particular, the 
gap between an international interpretation of the acceptance of a norm through, for example, 
formal adherence through treaties or establishment of institutions and the local understanding 
may be considerable.  Moreover, instrumentalism, as well as conformity to pre-existing 
norms, should be seen as a rational for norm localisation that carries within it the seeds of 
future conflict. Cortell and Davis (1996, p.453) observe that ‘governmental officials and 
societal actors can invoke an international rule to further their own particularist interests in 
domestic policy debates.’ 
 
2. FROM LIBERATION TO NEO-LIBERAL NARRATIVES IN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
 
The interplay between the emergence of a regional system founded and sustained by settler 
communities (reflected by a white settler narrative) and the cycles of conflict, resistance and 
reaction which gave rise to an African opposition and liberation movements (linked to a black 
liberation narrative), produced a dominant narrative that shaped the politics of post-
independent societies. Indeed, a neoliberal narrative, emerged out of the transition and 
reflected the growing consensus on the nature of the state and its relationship to the market, 
something that held profound implications for society. Each of these conflicting narratives 
became influential sources of policy and political action in the post-colonial period and 
became central to the local and regional responses to the Zimbabwean crisis as it played out. 
 
2.1. The liberation narrative and the dilemmas of independence 
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Dispossession of land was followed by displacement, the attack on traditional society through 
missionary work and civilian authorities, and all the accompanying indignities of submission 
to an alien culture. African nationalist movements emerged from the point of the introduction 
of laws dispossessing Africans from land ownership. The link between land and 
independence, even if clouded in sentimentality of loss, thus remained firm.  These powerful 
images served as the mainstay for anti-colonial movements as they sought to challenge the 
right of white settler regimes to govern African peoples and territories. This produced a 
liberation narrative, claiming its legitimacy in its historical opposition to colonialism with 
special emphasis on the peasantry and state control. 
 
Gaining the state was the fulfilment of decades of discontent, if not outright rebellion, within 
African societies. The black liberation movements successfully mobilised support from 
peasantry and urban masses around land question and civil rights. However, the fact of 
achieving and ruling underscored the modernist, anti-peasant outlook of much of the 
incoming leadership. As it transpired, the determination to replace the white government with 
a black elite was firmer than the desire to transform the socio-economic conditions of the bulk 
of the African population. Land restitution, once so important to liberation movements, was 
effectively abandoned in favour of elite transfers of resources and new ties of dependency 
with remaining white commercial interests. The locus of political power shifted away from 
the ‘iron triangle’ of the settler state era to one in which the urban environment was seen as 
the heart beat of the nation with the people in rural areas serving as reservoirs of political 
support to be drawn upon as dictated by need. 
 
In this situation, the ambiguous position of white settler communities (or indeed, other 
recognised minorities) whether they are significantly reduced in numbers or not and retaining 
a relatively privileged status in the society, acts as a potent symbol of the living past.  For a 
black elite in power that has assumed many of the trappings of the white settlers since 
independence, the temptation to invoke the liberation discourse is perhaps too great to avoid.  
Indeed, the expediency of doing so disallows one of the key features of ‘nation building’: 
what Renan (cited in Webner, 1998, p.74) has called the necessity of forgetting, that is the 
papering over the conflicts of the past which were in fact a seminal part of the formative 
process of creating the state. In this fashion, black elite accumulation fostered through control 
of the state is shielded behind a mask of (apparent) continuing white culpability and nefarious 
designs against African aspirations. The resulting liberation narrative shapes the very identity 
of the post-settler oligarchy and links it to a historical struggle against racism and colonialism 
in Africa generally. It is informed by three discourses, (i) one of solidarity (the liberation 
movement is the only rightful and legitimate heir to the colonial state by virtue of the struggle 
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and people owe it loyalty.  Anything less risks a return to the colonial era); (ii) one of national 
identity (in guise of nation-building, the relationship between minorities and ‘authentic’ 
citizens is constantly redefined) and (iii) one of symbolic restitution (symbolic acts, such as 
changing place names, replace genuine restitution and allow for a variety of elite 
accumulation strategies – sometimes taking the form of affirmative action or policies of 
‘Africanisation’). 
 
With the assumption of office, the liberation movements began to engage in the building of 
clientalist networks and rent-seeking practices that sought to displace the racially-structured 
relationships of the past.  Unfortunately, this approach was diametrically opposed by the 
dominant international narrative of neoliberalism which itself had informed the structure of 
the transitional arrangements in post-settler oligarchies. 
 
2.2. The neoliberalist narrative and the making of the new African state 
 
Neoliberalism is a narrative predicated upon rationalist assumptions about the nature  
of the international system as state-centric and motivated by rational calculations of self-
interest. Underlying the neoliberal programme is a commitment to establishing a new African 
state based on market principles and democratic practices. Neoliberal prescriptions deny the 
state a significant role in macro-economic management. Concurrently, through the application 
of ‘good governance’ criterion neoliberalism narrows the political sphere of action by the 
state to the fulfilment of facets of electoral democracy. 
 
Neoliberalism’s influence in Africa is especially pronounced. Ever since the onset of balance 
of payment crises in the early 1980s, the Western donors – as individuals but most evidently 
through the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – have promoted radical 
restructuring of developing countries through the application of economic and, from the 
1990s onwards, political conditionalities.  
 
The relationship between neoliberalist narrative and the liberation narrative is one of conflict 
and accommodation. During the era of white settler rule, neoliberalism offered a trenchant 
critique of the irrationalities inherent in statutory racial exclusion of the black majority in the 
economy (a position that found favour amongst the liberation movement). With the coming of 
independence and the trend towards black majority governments pursuing clientalist practices 
through such policies as the expansion of public sector, neoliberalism has been at the 
forefront of criticism, again based upon the distorting effects that this has on the economy (a 
position that has found favour with the remaining white settlers). This critique has been 
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extended to issues of governance as Western donors have sought to deepen the commitment 
to democratic values in the political systems of Southern African states. 
 
In democratic transitions, this interplay between international norms and domestic narratives, 
a ‘two-level norm game’, takes place against a backdrop of changing circumstances (‘world 
time context’) that affects dramatically state elite approaches to new norms and institutions as 
well as societies relationship to them.  Democratic transitions, which by definition are situated 
between the authoritarian past and a liberal constitutional future, are only partially embedded 
in the sense that while the international realm has conferred legitimacy upon the new 
government, in the domestic setting there may be only limited or contingent acceptance of the 
transitional arrangements (Jackson, 1990). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) point out that the 
saliency of domestic interests over international norms are at their strongest in the first phase 
of the norm life cycle, that is before the proverbial tipping point which initiates a norm 
cascade3. 
 
But while socialisation to the international community as a key source of legitimacy, the pull 
of conformity and attendant search for legitimising functions can also be felt at other levels. 
Following Axelrod (1986), states actively seek out like-minded states (‘peers’) and pursue 
policies which demonstrate congruence with these entities as a means of enhancing their 
credibility with local actors as well. Sustaining that status through cultivating the relationship 
with other like-minded states involves trust and reciprocity, which in turn fosters elite 
conformity (Ostrom, 1998, p.12-13). Especially, in the non-Western case, the weakness of 
new institutions and practices can cause leaders to seek recourse to conformity with like-
minded states as well as societal narratives whose basis in ‘traditional’ social structures and 
practices, all of which ultimately results in the decoupling of states to the nascent democratic 
norms which were foundational to the transition. This is what happened in Zimbabwe in the 
late 1990s. 
 
3. ZIMBABWE AND THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN 
SOUTHERN AFRICA 
 
It was neoliberalism which proved to be both the context and the catalyst for the crisis of the 
post-colonial state in Southern Africa. It exposed the contradictions inherent in the post-
                                               
3
‘ States conform with norms at stage 2 (norm cascade) for reasons that relate to their identities as 
members of international society…What happens at the tipping point is that enough states and enough 
critical states endorse the new norm to redefine appropriate behaviour for the identity called ‘state’ or 
some relevant subset of state (such as ‘liberal’ state or a European state)’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
1998, p.902). 
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colonial state, from the prevailing economic inequalities inherited from the colonial period to 
the complacency and even predatory conduct that accompanied the installation of a black elite 
in government. Moreover it laid bare the legal constraints on government action aimed at 
addressing critical economic and political problems. 
 
3.1. The Zimbabwean crisis 
 
Briefly, the crisis in Zimbabwe which has resulted in the effective collapse of the state has its 
roots in the history of the post-independence land settlement, contemporary economic and 
social policy and the particulars of Robert Mugabe’s (and Zanu-PF) drive to maintain power 
in the face of new political challengers (Meredith, 2001). Underlying the crisis was the 
colonial legacy of land distribution in which 10 million hectares of the country’s most viable 
land was owned – after nearly two decades of independence – by 4,500 mostly white 
commercial farmers and 18 million hectares was owned by about 850,000 black farmers in 
the so-called communal areas. The promised land distribution, which was predicated on the 
‘willing buyer and seller at market values’ approach (adopted by Namibia in 1989 and South 
Africa after 1994) and had called for 162,000 families to be resettled on 8.3 million hectares 
under Phase One of the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme, had resulted in only 
71,000 families being resettled on 3.5 million hectares of land by 1990.  The slow pace of 
land acquisition by the government, its redistribution to party apparatchiks and regime 
favourites rather than landless peasants, all served to fuel discontent within Zimbabwean 
society. 
 
At the same time, Brett (2005) describes that, by 1990, the government, industry and 
agriculture (the latter two still dominated by white interests) had come to the conclusion that 
the slowing pace of the Zimbabwean economy would only be improved through substantial 
structural liberalisation. In fact, the implementation of a structural adjustment programme, in 
conjunction with the difficulties of competing in the emergent international trading 
environment as well as the summary cancellation by Pretoria of a preferential trade 
agreement, all contributed to a contraction of the economy by 8 per cent in 1993, 
unemployment increasing to over 50 per cent, double-digit inflation (despite World Bank 
predictions that it would drop) and a collapse in social services. By 1997, growing dissent 
amongst public sector workers, who had borne much of the initial brunt of structural 
adjustment policies, was joined by veterans of the liberation struggle angry at the looting of 
their pensions by state officials. Shaken by protests, Mugabe re-opened the neglected land 
issue and proposed restitution through expropriation as a solution to the country’s economic 
ailments. The hasty convening of an international donor conference in Harare in September 
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1998 seemed to offer a credible route to resolving Zimbabwe’s land disparities. Funding 
amounting to Z$7.4 million was pledged to purchase 118 farms but the inception phase never 
happened due to conditions of transparency imposed by donors. Furthermore, following the 
disclosure of irregularities in national accounting designed to underplay the costs of a 
declining economy and a military intervention in Congo, brought about a suspension of IMF 
loans of US$193 million and US$140 million. 
 
In the wake of continued economic hardship, opposition political forces began to coalesce and 
in September 1999 the leader of the Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), Morgan 
Tsvangirai, prominent trade union activists, and some white business interests came together 
to form a new party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). However, after the 
ending of the Lancaster House constitutional proscriptions on mandatory white parliamentary 
representation in 1990, various attempts were made by Mugabe to alter aspects as to further 
entrench Zanu-PF rule through the creation of a one-party state which ultimately failed. A 
referendum to change the constitution was introduced in February 2000. Contrary to 
expectations, 55.9% of Zimbabweans polled, the majority urban based and anti-Mugabe 
supports, rejected the government-sponsored referendum  
 
Nevertheless, after the June 2000 parliamentary elections (in which the MDC, despite 
intimidation and the death of over thirty of its supporters, won 57 seats to Zanu-PF’s 62 
seats), Mugabe began to take aim at the independent judiciary that had been an obstacle to 
realising the ambitions to ‘accelerated’ land redistribution and increased the pace of land 
invasions. Opportunistic politicians, like the former government critic Jonathan Moyo, joined 
Mugabe in using the land issue to mobilise the simmering rural discontent – accentuated by 
economic privations – and, concurrently, stifle opposition voices by invoking the language of 
liberation. The land invasions continued unabated and Mugabe’s decree ordered in November 
2001 1000 farmers to leave their land within three months. 
 
3.2. The Regional Response 
 
The ex-settler states of South Africa and Namibia acted with a curious mix of equivocation, 
fear and support for the Zimbabwean government actions. South African president Thabo 
Mbeki articulated a policy of constructive engagement (called ‘quiet diplomacy’) which 
sought to encourage Mugabe privately on the path to reform while publicly proclaiming 
support for his actions (Schoeman and Alden, 2003). Zimbabwe was South Africa’s largest 
trading partner in Africa. The imposition of economic sanctions would impose high costs on 
South African businesses operating in the country and there was serious concern that a 
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destabilised Zimbabwe would ignite refugee flows and greater economic chaos across the 
region (Africa Institute, 2001). Namibia, whose direct ties with the Zimbabwean economy 
were far fewer, nonetheless was linked through its close monetary and trade links to South 
Africa. Its president, Sam Nujoma, had a close personal relationship with Mugabe and this 
contributed to Namibia’s support for Zimbabwean intervention in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo in 1998.  
 
At the SADC level, despite differences behind the scenes (especially at the August 2001 
SADC summit in Blantyre), regional solidarity marked the collective response to the 
Zimbabwean crisis in its initial phase4. At the same time, Mugabe began to speak openly at 
SADC summits of mobilizing the black population of neighbouring states to launch their own 
land occupations of white-owned commercial farms, raising the spectacle of economic 
disruption and political strife across the region. His most notable articulation of this was his 
vitriolic attack on the British government in front of world leaders at the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002. The Chief of Zimbabwe’s Defence Force, 
General Vitalis Zvinavashe, openly declared he would not be willing to serve under a 
president who had not been part of the liberation struggle, a position criticized by SADC 
leaders (Human Rights Watch, 2005). The rapturous receptions Mugabe and other top Zanu-
PF officials received at gatherings around the region, including South Africa and Namibia, 
underscored his growing popularity with African audiences. Mashabela (2002) declared at the 
WSSD summit that Mugabe was ‘speaking for black people worldwide’. 
 
The ramifications of the Zimbabwean crisis for the domestic situation in the former settler 
states were considerable (Lahiff and Cousins, 2001). Land activists, from the Transkei Land 
Services Organisation to the Landless Peoples Movement in South Africa to Namibian NGO 
and trade unionists, used the spectacle in Zimbabwe to raise questions about the continuing 
                                               
4
 A meeting between Mugabe and the leaders of South Africa and Mozambique in April 2000 ended 
with Mbeki and Joaquim Chissano proclaiming solidarity with the Zimbabwean leader (even when 
privately voicing their concerns). Nujoma was consistently supportive of Mugabe’s analysis of the 
origins of the crisis – colonial legacies and neo-imperialism – and the measures adopted by Zanu-PF to 
combat these factors. During the build up to Zimbabwe’s presidential elections of March 2002, South 
African officials sought to address the issue in the regional SADC setting, the continental forum of the 
Organization of African Unity, and internationally through the Commonwealth and the United Nations. 
Following the UN’s Millennium 2000 Summit, where Mbeki committed the government to play a role 
as intermediary between the international financial institutions and Zimbabwe at the behest of Kofi 
Annan, South African officials secured IMF support for a financial package to cover some of the costs 
of a land redistribution programme envisaged at a 1998 UN Development Programme conference. 
Britain itself was induced to pledge US$57 million towards the process, but again the agreement fell 
apart as Harare refused to be moved on the issue of ‘law and order’ and transparency. There was a last 
effort to resolve the land question in advance of the Zimbabwean presidential elections at a meeting in 
Abuja, Nigeria in September 2001 under the auspices of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group 
which promised British financial support for land reform and its results were swiftly endorsed by five 
SADC presidents.  
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inequities in land distribution in their countries. Many regional NGOs, who responded with a 
critical review of their own situations to Moyo’s comments criticising their inaction (Moyo, 
cited in Mwengo, 1999, p.7), moved to embrace a more aggressive public stance on the topic 
in future. New measures that they committed themselves to included ‘stimulating a faster 
pace of land reforms by exerting pressure on government and policy makers’ as well as 
‘influencing donors and other foreign interests to support land reform and redistribution 
processes’ (Mwengo, 1999, p.42). In Namibia, the Namibian National Farmers Union 
(NFFU), the Namibian NGO Forum (Nangof) and the National Union of Namibian Workers 
organised a march on parliament to protest the slow pace of land reform as well as their 
exclusion from consultation on proposed legislation on communal land rights5. After a visit to 
Zimbabwe in April 2000, the NNFU and Nangof were able to call upon the Zimbabwean 
experience as a stark warning to the government and the white commercial farmers that land 
reform was imperative to stability in Namibia, declaring, ‘Let us keep in mind that today is 
Zimbabwe and tomorrow could be Namibia.’6. 
 
The initial reaction of the South African and Namibian governments to this renewed local 
critique was defensive, denying the failure of their established land reform programmes to 
address inequalities inherited from the past and emphasising the importance of retaining the 
constitutional guarantees on property. With the lack of substantive progress on land and 
agrarian reform7, both governments experienced a rising tide of protest both within and 
outside ruling circles. In South Africa, where the reaction to the Zimbabwean crisis had been 
more divided, growing pressure within the ANC to take a harder line against Mugabe had 
been a feature of the public debate since the middle of 20008. But, at the same time, contrary 
expressions of support within the party were much in evidence. For example, Kgalema 
Motlanthe, ANC Secretary General, declared that Zimbabwe’s land occupations were a 
‘protest action’ and that the land imbalance in that country was ‘immoral’ (cited in Lahiff and 
Cousins, 2001, p.655). The popularity of Zanu-PF amongst ANC party rank and file was 
clearly illustrated by the cheers which greeted Emmerson Mnangagwa, at that time Mugabe 
                                               
5
 The Namibian, 8 September 1999, www.namibian.com.na. 
6
 Press statement released by the Namibian National Farmers Union and Namibian NGO Forum, 24 
May 2000. 
7
 In South Africa, over 84% (out of the 87%) of agricultural land remained in the hands of white 
owners, leaving in the words of activists, the apartheid-era land ownership imbalance virtually 
unchanged (Anseeuw, 2004). Between 1994 and 1999 only 5000 of an estimated 63,500 land 
restitution claims had been settled by the government.  In Namibia, where 3,800 white commercial 
farmers owned 80% of the arable land, as little progress was made on agrarian reform.  By 2001, only 
97 commercial farms (totalling 568,821 hectares) had been acquired for resettlement and 1,964 black 
families resettled. 
8
 The ANC’s alliance partners, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African 
Communist Party, became increasingly vocal in their criticism of spiral of violence and attacks on 
Zimbabwean trade unions and the media (Irin, 2001). 
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chosen successor, at the annual ANC party congress in 20029. The composition of the MDC, 
led by black trade unionists and white agricultural interests, mirrored in broad terms 
(potentially) discontented factions within South Africa and Namibia’s own political 
landscape: there was a visceral reaction within ANC and Swapo circles against legitimising 
the MDC over the interests of a fellow liberation movement.  
 
In the end, the power of the critique levelled by local activists (echoed if not articulated by 
Mugabe), coupled to the pressure to demonstrate tangible progress on land reform since 
independence, contributed to the two governments’ review of their policies.  Both the ANC 
and Swapo acknowledged the shortcomings of the market-based approach to reform, a key 
component of the historic compromise which ushered in the transition to democracy. As a 
result, government expropriation became formally introduced and implemented to pressure 
reluctant white farmers to put their land up for sale. In South Africa, Mbeki committed to 
transforming black ownership of farmland to 30% of all land by 2015 and increased by the 
finances available to the Department of Land Affairs to purchase farms as well as legal tools 
to speed expropriation.  In Namibia, despite inflammatory language by Nujoma, the emphasis 
on due process was continually underscored by the government as it sought to resettle the 
estimated 240,000 landless Namibians. 
 
3.3. Enduring Economies, Conflicting Ideas and Decoupling Norms  
 
Ex-settler oligarchies did not consolidate their democracies more easily than other African 
transitional states – which had been widely expected by transitologists – and exhibited instead 
backsliding towards neo-patrimonial practices or even authoritarianism for a number of 
reasons. In the first instance, this was due to the fact that the transitional arrangements put 
into place a liberal constitutional regime that did not address the underlying structures of 
settler colonialism. SADC states, despite periods of criticism of Mugabe’s actions and their 
ensuing impact on the region, invariably couched their collective statements in language 
which reaffirmed their shared identity as liberation movements and victims of colonialism. 
Even Southern Africa’s civil society actors, despite a diversity of national experiences and 
general distrust of government, were able to draw upon the common thread of colonialism 
and land dispossession by settler communities to reaffirm their shared identity and definition 
of the regional dimensions of the land question (Mwengo, 2000). It situated the new state in 
relation to largely domestic rural societies with traditionalist outlooks and fellow independent 
                                               
9
 Mail and Guardian, 26 April 2003,www.mg.co.za. 
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states in the region, building upon common sources of legitimacy that were fostered through 
the operational norm of regional solidarity. 
 
The internalisation of new norms, which Linz and Stepan (1996) considered to be the third 
measure of genuine consolidation, was deemed to be non-problematic for ex-settler 
oligarchies by transitologists due to the basic acceptance of democratic and market practices 
by these predecessor regimes. However, this did not take into account the possibility that 
norm diffusion could be more apparent than real. For instance, norm congruence (‘grafting’) 
considered crucial to introducing and gaining acceptance of new norms, may allow for a 
temporal proximity between two norms and even an appearance of norm acceptance (Acharia, 
2003). Norm conflict re-emerged in times of crisis (the ‘tipping point’) and, in the context of 
the structural challenges to power which the land issue raised, could see political regimes 
jettison aspects of liberal-constitutionalism in favour of societally-grounded norms whose 
saliency ensured greater political support.  Far from inspiring a norm cascade, crisis at this 
phase in a new democracy might inspire norm de-coupling that shed the nascent ideas and 
constitutive institutions for the stability offered by pre-existing norms. As the Zimbabwean 
crisis developed, it exposed the limitations of the liberal-constitutional regime put into place 
by the democratic transition – both in that country itself and its fellow ex-settler oligarchies to 
the South – and brought about serious alteration or even abandonment of the constitutive 
norms based on neo-liberalism. 
 
Exacerbating this weak embeddedness of new democratic ideals within Southern Africa has 
been the elite character of transition itself.  Negotiated in the name of their constituencies by 
externally recognised parties who achieved this status usually through recourse to non-
democratic armed political action (be it liberation movement or settler government), the 
perspectives which ultimately influenced elite decision-making on the structuring of post-
independence institutions did not necessarily represent either the perspectives of broader 
peasant-dominated societies nor did it always reflect the assertion of democratic ideals. In this 
way post-independent governing elites found themselves not only beneficiaries but defenders 
of institutions and practices derived from the transition without necessarily sharing their 
underlying values.  The end result of this process was that the transition to majority rule 
allowed for the co-existence of two narratives – triumph of liberation and triumph of neo-
liberalism – whose contingent nature and contradictions were not apparent to transitologists. 
Democracy had triumphed, as proven by the overwhelmingly electoral support new 





Following from the incorporation of the literature on norms, the article extrapolates upon 
transnational norms as an important tool for divining the role of regional dynamics in shaping 
formal institutions and informal practices. The impact of the wash of ideas emanating from 
Zimbabwe that swept across former settler states, exposing unexpected fissures in Namibia 
and South Africa, held influence for governments and societies alike is precisely due to the 
inter-relationship between regional and domestic norms.  
 
While the trigger of the crisis in Zimbabwe may have been challenges posed by neoliberalism 
to the post-colonial state, the conflict as played out in the region itself came to be centred on 
the issue of land. The public airing of the long buried land question in independent states 
tapped into societally grounded narratives that inspired political entrepreneurs and 
inadvertently began to bring pressure to bear on these same governments. This was 
particularly the case with Zimbabwe, which led the way within the region in using the land 
issue as a counter to the challenges posed by neoliberalism. Concurrently, and here Zimbabwe 
again was at the regional forefront, the crisis inspired by neoliberalism provided a rationale 
for political opportunists to review and reinterpret the key features of the post-colonial state 
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